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CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
MERRICK BOBB* 
INTRODUCTION 
More than ten years have elapsed since the Rodney King incident where 
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department were recorded on a bystander’s 
videotape beating an African-American motorist senseless with their batons.1  
Since then there has been wave upon wave of controversial incidents rocking 
the foundations of U.S. law enforcement.  Events in two of the nation’s most 
highly respected police departments, the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), serve as graphic 
examples. In New York, the NYPD’s brutalization of Abner Louima2 and the 
shooting of Amadou Diallo3 generated strong criticism.  Officers involved in 
the Louima case were put on trial.4  In Los Angeles, the LAPD has been almost 
constantly subject to one investigation or another since the Rodney King 
beating.  Recently, the LAPD suffered embarrassment and opprobrium from 
the Rampart scandal, where LAPD officers were shown to have planted 
evidence and guns and wrongfully shot young Latinos suspected of gang 
activity.5 
 
* Merrick Bobb was the first person to occupy the role of police monitor and has monitored the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department for seven years.  Mr. Bobb is the founding director of 
the Police Assessment Resource Center, a resource center having the goals of advancing best 
practices and spurring innovation in the field of police oversight. 
 1. Patt Morrison, Deja Vu All Over Again, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at B2, 
1997 WL 2242317. 
 2. Morrison, supra note 1. 
 3. Shooting by Police Sparks Protest March, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at A9, 
1999 WL 2130409. 
 4. United States v. Volpe, 42 F. Supp.2d 204, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Prosecution Closes Its 
Case Against 4 Cops in Torture Trial, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1999 at 15, 1999 WL 2879583. 
 5. BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT, LOS ANGELES 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, PUBLIC REPORT (2000), www.lapdonline.org/pdf_files/pc/boi_pub.pdf; 
RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL 
(2000), http://www.ci.la.ca.us/oig/rirprpt.pdf; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, AN INDEPENDENT 
ANALYSIS OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT’S BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT ON THE 
RAMPART SCANDAL (2000), reprinted in 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 549, 551 (2001). 
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Events in other cities, too, have contributed to the concern over police 
conduct.  In April 2001, there was rioting in the city of Cincinnati following 
the fifteenth consecutive police shooting of a young African-American male.6  
This past summer, television stations repeatedly aired videotape showing an 
Inglewood, California, police officer picking up a handcuffed, passive, young, 
black man; slamming him into the hood of a police car; and then punching him 
in the face.7 
In the wake of these and other similar events, informed public opinion has 
expressed strong misgivings about whether law enforcement is capable of 
unsupervised self-regulation—whether the police can police themselves and 
deal appropriately with unethical conduct, be it corruption or misuse of force.  
This public concern has lead to experimentation over the last ten years with 
different methods of civilian oversight and control.  Before considering further 
how these different experiments have worked, though, it is interesting to 
consider some basic facts about American policing. 
I.  A BRIEF SKETCH OF AMERICAN POLICING 
Unlike the pattern in many places in the world where law enforcement is 
exclusively a state or national function, policing in the United States is 
predominantly a matter for local, municipal government.  Although there are 
federal law enforcement agencies like the FBI, the Border Patrol, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, their jurisdiction is limited to defined federal 
crimes.8  Individual states within the United States do have statewide police 
forces, such as the California Highway Patrol or the New York State Troopers, 
but their jurisdiction generally extends to patrolling the roads and highways in 
the state.9  The overwhelming amount of municipal street patrol and other 
basic police services is provided by local law enforcement agencies, including 
both police and local sheriff’s departments.  There are far more individual law 
enforcement agencies in the United States than one would expect. 
 
 6. Protest Spills Into the Streets, CINCINNATI POST, April 10, 2001, 
http://www.cincypost.com/2001/apr/10/prot041001.htm. 
 7. Richard Marosi, Use of Force Probed in Videotaped Arrest, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at 
B1, 2002 WL 2488488. 
 8. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, GENERAL FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 
at http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/faqs/faqsone.htm; IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
SERVICES, OVERVIEW: U.S. BORDER PATROL, at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawenfor/ 
bpatrol/overview.htm; U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEA MISSION STATEMENT, 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm. 
 9. See CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, WHAT WE DO, at http://www.chp.ca.gov/html/ 
what_we_do.html; NEW YORK STATE, OVERVIEW: NEW YORK STATE POLICE, at 
http://www.troopers.state.ny.us/Intro/IntroOverview.html. 
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Indeed, there are more than 16,000 local law enforcement agencies in the 
United States.  Of this total, 13,524 are local police departments;10 the rest are 
sheriff’s departments.11  There are about 436,000 full-time, sworn police 
officers in these 13,000 police departments, and about 186,000 full-time, 
sworn employees in the sheriff’s departments.12  Of the 436,000 full-time 
police officers, slightly more than one-third work in an agency having 1000 or 
more officers, even though these agencies account for only 0.3% of the total 
number of police departments.13  While departments with 100 or more full-
time police officers account for only about 4% of the total, they employ three-
fifths of the full-time officers.14  The great majority of the police departments, 
about 77% (more than 10,000), have fewer than 25 police officers, while about 
52% have fewer than 10 officers.15  There are only about 1300 police 
departments, about 10%, with more than 50 police officers.16 
The largest police departments are obviously in the largest cities.  But even 
in the largest cities, there are wide variations in the number of officers as 
compared with the number of residents.  New York City, with a population of 
approximately 8 million people, has over 40,000 police officers, or 53 per 
10,000 residents, one of the highest police officer-to-resident ratios in the 
United States.17  Chicago, which has about 3 million people, has 13,000 
officers, or 49 per 10,000 residents.18  Los Angeles, on the other hand, with 
nearly 4 million people, only has about 9,000 police officers, or 27 per 10,000 
residents.19 
Police officers are generally well paid.  The overall, average, base starting 
salary for a police officer in 1997 was about $23,300,20 significantly above the 
per capita, annual income in the United States of about $19,200.21  In the 
largest departments, the average starting salary was $30,600.22  By 
 
 10. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1999 1 (2001), www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
abstract/lpd99. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. BRIAN A. REAVES & ANDREW L. GOLDBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1997 7 (2000). 
 21. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. COMMERCE DEP’T, PUB. NO. 60-200, MONEY INCOME IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 1997 x (1998), http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p60-200.pdf. 
 22. REAVES, supra note 20, at 7. 
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comparison, in the smallest departments, the chief of police had an average 
salary of about $25,700, and in the largest departments, the chief had an 
average salary in excess of $100,000.23  In Los Angeles both the Chief of 
Police and the Sheriff make over $200,000 annually.24 
Police officers in the United States are moderately well educated.  Eighty-
three percent of all US police departments require at least a high school degree 
to become a police officer, while fourteen percent require at least two years of 
college, and one percent requires a four-year college degree.25  While in large 
U.S. cities, police recruits undergo an average of about 1300 hours of 
classroom and field training, the average police officer in the United States is 
required to undergo approximately 1000 hours of training.26  On the average, a 
police officer in the United States also receives about thirty hours of additional 
in-service training each year.27 
Policing is considered a dangerous profession, but the number of police 
officers killed in a given year is relatively small.  In the year 2000, fifty-one 
police officers were killed feloniously throughout the United States; and in 
1999, the number was forty-two.28  Of the fifty-one officers killed in 2000, 
thirteen were killed while responding to traffic pursuits or stops, twelve were 
killed while making arrests, ten in ambushes, eight while responding to 
disturbance calls, six while investigating suspicious persons and 
circumstances, and two while transporting prisoners.29  In the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department (a local law enforcement agency that I monitor), 
which has approximately 8000 sworn officers patrolling a population of about 
2 million persons (40 per 10,000 residents),30 there were seven officers killed 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Los Angeles County Sheriff, in LOS ANGELES ALMANAC, 
http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Government/g103c.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003) 
(“The Los Angeles County Sheriff earns the highest annual salary of any county employee - 
$207,000.”); Mariel Garza, Mayor Introduces Nominee for Chief, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 3, 
2002, http://www.dailynews.com/Stories/0,1413,200%7E20954%7E901835,00,htm (candidate 
for police chief’s job was offered “an annual salary of $239,039, less than the $247,000 paid to 
[the then current chief]”). 
 25. REAVES, supra note 20, at 5. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND 
ASSAULTED 2000 28 (2001). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, History of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department (1849-1999), http://www.lasd.org/about_lasd/history2.htm (2,046,740 citizens and 
8088 sworn personnel as of Dec 31, 1998). 
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and fifty-one wounded in the ten year period between 1991 and 2001.31  Last 
year in that department, there was one officer killed, and two wounded.32 
Encounters by residents with the police are relatively rare.  In 1996, a 
survey showed that, of the approximately 280 million people in the United 
States,33 an estimated 44.6 million people had face-to-face contact with a 
police officer during the prior twelve months.34  An estimated 33% of residents 
who had contact with the police had either asked for assistance, or had 
provided it to officers.35  About 32% of those who had contact with the police 
had reported a crime, either as a victim or a witness.36  Of all persons who had 
contact with the police, only 1% said the police officer used force or threatened 
to use force.37 
In a study of use of force patterns in six law enforcement agencies in 
connection with 7500 adult custody arrests, researchers found that use of 
serious force was infrequent.38  According to the study, in 97.9% of the arrests 
the police did not use a weapon.39  If a weapon was used, the most frequent 
was oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, which was used in 1.2% of the arrests in 
the study.40  The second most frequently used weapon was the flashlight, used 
in 0.5% of the arrests.41  Batons were used in 0.2%, handguns in 0.1%, and 
rifles or shotguns in another 0.1% of arrests.42  In contrast, however, handguns 
were displayed by the police, though not used, in 2.7% of the arrests.43 
 
 31. These statistics combine information available in two sources: MERRICK J. BOBB ET AL., 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 14TH SEMIANNUAL REP. (2001), http://lacounty.info/ 
mbobb14.pdf, also available at http://www.co.la.ca.us/bobbreports/mbobb14.pdf; Memorandum 
from Karyn Mannis, Lieutenant, Internal Affairs Bureau, to William McSweeney, Commander, 
Office of the Undersheriff 2 (Jan. 23, 2002) (on file with author). 
 32. Memorandum from Karyn Mannis, supra note 31, at 2. 
 33. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 GATEWAY, http://www.census.gov/main/www/ 
cen2000.html. 
 34. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ-165040, POLICE USE OF FORCE: COLLECTION OF NATIONAL DATA iv 
(1998), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/puof.pdf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at cover page. 
 38. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ-176330, USE OF FORCE 
BY POLICE: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 31 (1999), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/abstract/ufbponld.htm.  The use of force study involved police departments in Dallas, Texas; 
San Diego, California; Colorado Springs, Colorado; St. Petersburg, Florida; Charlotte, North 
Carolina; and the Sheriff’s Department in San Diego County, California. 
 39. Id. at 30. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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Use of lethal force by the police is not as widespread as one might think 
from watching movies and television.  In cities over 500,000 people, there are 
0.5 persons shot by the police per 100,000 residents per year.44 
Regardless of the fact that use of force is a relatively rare occurrence, there 
is heightened concern across the United States about the use of excessive force 
by police.  Over the last ten years, it seems that a consensus has formed that 
law enforcement agencies rarely, if ever, confront problems of excessive force, 
or undertake substantial internal reform on their own.  Over the same ten years, 
different ways to introduce more civilian oversight and control of law 
enforcement have been tried.  Among these means, providing an outside, 
civilian organization with significant or exclusive responsibility for the 
investigation into an alleged misuse of force has become increasingly popular.  
Yet, there remains genuine disagreement among advocates for police reform 
about the wisdom of a wholesale displacement of law enforcement’s internal 
investigative apparatus in favor of outside review panels of lay persons, 
particularly where the power to adjudicate and impose discipline is taken away 
from the department, whether in whole or in part. 
Those who advocate in favor such displacement argue that self-policing 
will necessarily and unavoidably produce a biased result; that even reasonable, 
honest, and well-intentioned police investigators simply cannot overcome the 
pressures from all sides that come to bear on internal investigations of an 
officer-involved shooting, a death in the jail, or a serious use of force on the 
street.  The pressure can come from many sources.  It may come from 
superiors within the police organization who do not want an embarrassing 
incident publicly exposed, or who fear the credibility and authority of the 
police will be undermined if a use of force is held to be against policy.  
Pressure may come from the police union, which may be inclined to vigorously 
defend even bad officers.  A mayor or city council may not want to hear bad 
news about the police department, and may encourage suppression of it.  
Finally, fellow officers may not want to see one of their peers held up to 
withering scrutiny. 
It is useful to take an officer-involved shooting as an example of what can 
happen when internal affairs or homicide investigators give in to those 
pressures.  While officers may lawfully use deadly force, a determination must 
be made in each instance if such use was appropriate.  When the police 
investigate one of their own officers who has been involved in a shooting, bias 
may show up in many ways.  For example, the investigation may be half-
hearted, wherein not all relevant witnesses are interviewed or even attempted 
to be located, particularly those witnesses who might give testimony 
unfavorable to the officer.  Interviews of the officer himself may be tainted: 
 
 44. Leen et al., D.C. Police Lead Nation in Shootings, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at A1. 
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investigators may simply pitch softball, open-ended questions to the officer, 
allowing him to give a narrative answer that is not given rigorous cross-
examination.  More troubling still, investigators, at times, may use leading 
questions that seem to signal to the officer what he is supposed to say in order 
to get off the hook: “You were in fear for your life, weren’t you?” or “You 
thought your partner was about to be shot, correct?” or “You saw the suspect 
reach for his waistband and withdraw a black, shiny object you thought was a 
gun, right?” 
A significant number of shootings reviewed by law enforcement monitors, 
the federal Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, and inspectors 
general have been, in one law enforcement agency’s parlance, “lawful but 
awful”45—lawful in the sense that they may not have been instances of 
intentional, criminal wrongdoing, but awful in that they involved recklessness 
or grossly negligent conduct, tactics, or strategy.  Assuming that the officer 
involved in the shooting had received proper training, shootings of that kind 
should routinely be held to be contrary to policy.  Too often, however, due to 
the pressures that come to bear on the investigation, they are not. 
There is a natural, predictable, human impulse involved; even in the 
absence of external pressures, no law enforcement officer can examine an 
officer-involved shooting without saying at some level, “There but for the 
grace of God go I.”  The trauma of having to kill another person, though faced 
by very few police officers, is, nonetheless, so great that for American police 
officers, in general, it is difficult for one police officer to question another’s 
decision that he had to do so.  Who is to say that if faced with the same 
situation, he would not have pulled the trigger?  The empathy one police 
officer has for another is entirely understandable.  Still, it cannot be allowed to 
cloud one’s judgment, or cause one to reach unjust results. 
Complicating the issue is the tendency of police officers to close ranks 
when faced with an investigation, creating what has been called the “blue 
wall,” enforcing a code of silence by intimidating any officer who shows any 
willingness to cooperate with investigators, or point the finger at a fellow 
officer. 
A case that recently arose in New York City makes that point.  A New 
York City police officer, while driving his patrol car, struck and killed a 
pregnant, twenty-four year old woman, her sixteen-year-old sister, and her 
four-year-old son.  The woman’s unborn child died hours after being delivered 
by Caesarean section.  The New York City police officer had been on a twelve-
hour drinking binge that began outside the station house, and continued at a 
strip club that was off limits to officers in the precinct.  During the trial of the 
 
 45. BOBB ET AL., supra note 31, at 15 n.5 (“The LASD has its own colorful term for some of 
these kinds of shootings: ‘Lawful but awful.’”). 
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officer, who was convicted of manslaughter, it came to light that fellow NYPD 
officers suppressed vital evidence, and tried to cover up that the officer had 
been drinking.46  A writer in the New York Times commented: “[T]he killing 
of a pregnant woman and two family members was . . . an unspeakable horror.  
But the investigation is focusing on whether any [NYPD] officers closed 
ranks” to help the drunk officer.47 
Similarly, in the Abner Louima case, where a black man was tortured in a 
station house when a broken broom handle was shoved up his rectum, the 
police union was alleged to have conspired with certain of the police officers 
involved to frustrate an investigation.48 
Thus, many police reform advocates conclude that police organizations are 
hopelessly insular, endlessly self-referential, and mistrustful of outsiders.  
Accordingly, these reformers argue, the power of law enforcement to 
investigate and self-police must be taken away and given to a review board. 
On the other hand, there are those reform advocates who argue that the 
power to adjudicate wrongdoing and impose discipline belongs, at least 
presumptively, to the law enforcement agency in question.  Without 
responsibility to adjudicate wrongdoing and impose discipline, these reformers 
argue, senior executives in the law enforcement agency cannot be held 
personally accountable for dealing with police misconduct, and will simply 
blame the civilian review board for its decisions.  Their argument continues by 
stating that unless the police are held strictly accountable up and down the 
chain of command for actively managing the risk of police misconduct, the 
self-protective habits of the police will never change.  It is one thing to achieve 
a fair result in a given investigation; it is far more powerful, these reformers 
contend, to change police culture in general by requiring strict accountability. 
Yet, even police reformers who question the wisdom of displacing a police 
department’s power to investigate internal misconduct do not contend that self-
policing is an inalienable right.  Rather, both sides agree that the ability to 
police oneself is a rare privilege afforded only to certain, highly trained and 
disciplined professionals—be it university faculty, lawyers, doctors, or 
certified public accountants.  The privilege comes with heavy obligations to 
demonstrate upon demand, in any individual case or in general, that the results 
reached by self-policing are fair, reasonable, and based on thorough and 
dispassionate investigation.  If that burden cannot be met, then the privilege is 
 
 46. William K. Rashbaum, After Ex-Officer’s Conviction, Challenging the Blue Wall, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 1, at 43. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Graham Rayman, Code of Silence Challenge, Louima’s Lawyers Accuse NYPD, PBA, 
NEWSDAY, Aug. 7, 1998, at A31. 
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no longer merited, and should be taken away; or, at least, the power to 
investigate must be shared with civilian overseers. 
There is increasingly broad agreement that whether or not the police retain 
the power to investigate themselves, law enforcement’s business, in general, is 
the public’s business, and therefore must be an open and transparent process.  
In some instances, law enforcement agencies voluntarily agree to allow agency 
monitors previously unprecedented access to internal records.  As a result, 
detailed information about the use of force, which heretofore had never seen 
the light of day, is made public.  In jurisdictions where the police have been 
more amenable to voluntary reform efforts, the displacement of investigatory 
and disciplinary authority may be an unnecessary and avoidable step.  
Everywhere, however, the privilege of the police to self-regulate comes with 
an obligation to fully open the agency’s records to responsible public 
representatives.  If this obligation is not met, the privilege is no longer merited. 
The mechanism for demonstrating a fair and reasonable procedure that has 
proven least threatening to law enforcement, yet still effective, is the 
appointment of an independent monitor upon the acquiescence of the law 
enforcement agency to be monitored.  Generally, these monitors make public 
reports on the integrity of internal police processes.  There seems to be a 
growing view, however, that in some circumstances monitoring and reporting 
alone may not be enough to reduce excessive force and produce better internal 
police investigations.  In such circumstances, police reformers advocate that 
the power to investigate police misconduct should be ceded by the police, in 
whole or in part, to qualified, independent investigative bodies.  In rare 
circumstances, where even more stringent measures are needed to decrease the 
use of excessive lethal and non-lethal force, the federal government is 
statutorily authorized to impose, not only compulsory monitoring, but far-
reaching, departmental reforms in an attempt to end these unacceptable 
patterns or practices.49  The remainder of this article will describe some of the 
various options currently in use to place police agencies under heightened 
civilian oversight and control. 
II.  INDEPENDENT MONITORS 
In the past ten years, there has been healthy experimentation with 
independent monitors.  These individuals or groups are appointed by local 
government with the acquiescence of the law enforcement agency in question, 
and given unprecedented access to law enforcement files, records, and 
personnel in order to critically review and publicly comment on the 
performance of the police in controlling excessive force.  For example, in my 
capacity as Special Counsel for the County of Los Angeles, I monitor and 
 
 49. See infra notes 63, 65-66, and accompanying text. 
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oversee the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD).50  The 
executive branch of the county government that appointed me has guaranteed 
in writing that I will have unfettered access “to such confidential records of the 
County of Los Angeles, its departments and officers [including the Sheriff’s 
Department] as may be material and relevant” to my investigations.51  I 
comment every six months in written reports on the progress or lack of 
progress of the LASD in controlling excessive force. 
During the years that I have monitored and reported on the LASD, from 
1993 to the present, excessive force has been substantially curbed.  Although it 
would be overreaching to suggest that reporting and monitoring alone achieved 
the downturn in the use of force, they contributed to it.  The results, in any 
event, are impressive. 
In the past ten years, a time during which the LASD has been subject to 
ongoing, independent, outside investigation and monitoring, the number of 
suspects killed or wounded by that department on a yearly basis has dropped 
from a high in 1991 of sixty-three persons to a low of eighteen persons in 
2000, dropping by approximately seventy percent.52  During the same time 
period, the number of law enforcement officers in the Sheriff’s Department 
that have been killed or wounded dropped from a high in 1991 of ten to a low 
of three in 2001.53  Important to this comparison, during the same ten-year 
period the number of arrests by the Sheriff’s Department has remained roughly 
constant.54 
Besides the individual injury statistics, another set of statistics that is 
relevant to an analysis of the use of excessive force by police relates to 
lawsuits filed against the agency on behalf of the victims of such force.  While 
 
 50. The LASD and the LAPD are two different law enforcement agencies.  Each operates 
within the County of Los Angeles, a large geographic area in southern California with 
approximately 10 million residents.  The City of Los Angeles, with approximately 4 million 
residents, is the largest city in the County of Los Angeles.  The LAPD, with about 9000 sworn 
officers, is the principal law enforcement agency within the city.  The LASD, with about 8000 
sworn officers, is the principal law enforcement agency outside the City of Los Angeles and 
serves approximately 2 million county residents.  Smaller municipal police departments serve the 
balance of some 4 million county residents.  In addition to providing basic police services, the 
LASD also operates the Los Angeles county jail system.  With an average daily inmate 
population of nearly 20,000, the Los Angeles county jails are the largest urban jail system in the 
United States. 
 51. Employment contract between the County of Los Angeles and Merrick J. Bobb, Contract 
#73890, Contract for Special Counsel (adopted by the Board of Supervisors Jan. 29, 2002) (on 
file with author). 
 52. BOBB ET AL., supra note 31, at 81; Memorandum from Karyn Mannis, supra note 31, at 
2. 
 53. BOBB ET AL., supra note 31, at 81; Memorandum from Karyn Mannis, supra note 31, at 
2. 
 54. BOBB ET AL., supra note 31, at 85, 88. 
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the availability of money damages in such a lawsuit is a deterrent to the use of 
excessive force, public reporting of the number of cases and total damage 
payments adds to this deterrent effect.  During the past ten years of outside, 
independent monitoring and reporting, the total docket of excessive force cases 
on file against the LASD has dropped from a high of 381 cases in fiscal year 
1992-1993 to a low of 70 cases in fiscal year 1998-1999.55  The amounts paid 
out in settlements and judgments of excessive force cases dropped from a high 
of $17 million in fiscal year 1995-1996 to a low of $1.62 million in fiscal year 
1997-1998.56 
The public monitoring reports, which address the fundamental excessive 
force and integrity issues in policing, are calculated to foster a constructive, 
task-oriented, and problem-solving dialog, stripped of ideology and rhetoric.  
A primary goal is to assist the department in devising ways to eliminate 
excessive or unnecessary, lethal or non-lethal force.  Another goal is for law 
enforcement to learn to handle situations that legitimately call for the use of 
force in a way that produces an acceptable result from the law enforcement 
perspective while providing a reduced risk of injury to both the officer and the 
suspect.  Approaching the reports with these goals in mind sharpens the 
strategic and tactical analysis, and makes room for a wider and more free-
ranging inquiry into alternative solutions to the control of excessive force.  By 
stripping the discussion of blame, rhetoric, and ideology, everyone involved is 
freer to focus on the problem rather than worrying about mistrustful 
suspicions, personal motivations, and political agendas.  In addition to the hope 
of providing both better and safer policing, it is hoped that the risk of legal 
liability for the law enforcement agency will be significantly reduced. 
Monitors are accountable to different constituencies.  First, each is 
accountable to the law enforcement agency to provide assistance or reports 
calculated to focus police management on internal decision-making, policy 
formulation, and efforts to responsibly anticipate and manage liability risk. 
More importantly, a monitor is accountable to the public at large to provide a 
thorough and fair appraisal of law enforcement, and to make the heretofore 
mystery-shrouded, internal processes of the police more transparent and 
comprehensible. 
To fulfill these dual responsibilities to agency and the general public, a 
monitor must speak candidly about weaknesses in internal police mechanisms 
for accountability and responsibility.  The monitor must scour and test the law 
enforcement agency’s policies, procedures, and practices to determine whether 
they are, in fact, up to the job of preventing misconduct.  The monitor should 
propose new policies and practices where the old ones have failed.  
 
 55. Id. at 95. 
 56. Id. at 96. 
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Additionally, an independent monitor ought to consider how the agency he or 
she is monitoring compares to other police departments with respect to the use 
of lethal and non-lethal force.  After such comparison, the monitor should 
suggest the implementation of best practices from other law enforcement 
agencies. 
Although voluntary, independent monitoring exists in only a few 
jurisdictions, mostly in California, it can be a powerful and useful device.  
Monitoring enables persons from outside of law enforcement to conduct an 
agency review, and then report frankly to the public about the fairness, 
thoroughness, and integrity of internal police processes for self-examination, 
self-investigation, and self-regulation.  Monitors can be used by themselves or 
in conjunction with independent investigators, the next topic to be considered. 
III.  INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATORS 
In addition to monitors, some jurisdictions have experiments afoot in 
which civilians from outside the law enforcement agency are empowered to 
oversee and direct police internal affairs investigations.  In Seattle, 
Washington, for example, a civilian lawyer has been placed in charge of 
Internal Affairs within the Seattle Police Department.57  She reports directly to 
the Chief of Police.  Her title is Director of the Office of Professional 
Accountability (OPA).  The office was created within the Seattle Police 
Department to receive and investigate complaints of misconduct by Seattle 
police officers.  The responsibilities of the OPA also include regularly advising 
the Chief of Police, the Mayor, and City Council on all matters involving the 
police department’s investigatory and disciplinary functions, as well as 
recommending policy on issues relating to the professional standards of the 
police department.  The OPA also evaluates the internal investigation process, 
and makes recommendations on strategies and policies to improve complaint 
gathering and investigative procedures. 
As another example, the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County 
created the Office of Independent Review (OIR) in 2001.58  This group of six 
lawyers with significant civil rights experience has been empowered to direct 
and shape internal affairs investigations in the LASD.  No investigation can be 
closed unless the OIR certifies that it was full, fair, and thorough.  The OIR has 
the power to participate as necessary and appropriate in ongoing investigations 
by internal affairs, including interviewing witnesses, responding to crime 
scenes, and reviewing tangible evidence and relevant documentation.  The OIR 
 
 57. OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, ABOUT 
DIRECTOR SAM PAILCA, http://www.cityofseattle.net/police/OPA/Directorinfo.html. 
 58. OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, WELCOME, 
http://www.laoir.com. 
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monitors all ongoing, internal investigations, and reviews all completed 
investigations to ensure that the content, disposition, and recommended 
discipline are appropriate.  Additionally, the OIR is empowered to make 
recommendations of disposition and discipline on all investigations within its 
purview.  Note that with the creation of the OIR, the LASD, not only has an 
independent monitor (discussed in section I), but also shares with civilians the 
responsibility for internal investigations. 
With respect to the LAPD, the power to investigate and adjudicate 
misconduct is shared by LAPD’s Internal Affairs, a Police Commission, and an 
Inspector General.59  The Commission, appointed by the Mayor of Los 
Angeles and comprised of five civilians from outside of law enforcement, is 
empowered to decide whether officer-involved shootings and other serious 
uses of force are proper or improper in light of the policies and standards of the 
LAPD.  If the Commission decides a use of force is improper, the responsible 
police officer is subject to discipline or retraining.  The Inspector General has 
independent investigatory authority, and also is required to provide 
independent opinions to the Commission on the propriety of LAPD shootings 
and serious uses of force.  The Inspector General may also issue reports to the 
public on the integrity of the LAPD’s disciplinary system. 
The very recent experiments in Seattle with the OPA and in Los Angeles 
County with the OIR are among the most exciting and promising new efforts to 
instill accountability through civilian oversight and participation.  If they work 
well, they could ultimately replace civilian review boards, which we consider 
next. 
IV.  CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARDS 
Another frequently used model for police oversight is the civilian review 
board.  These boards have been in use for many years.  They are usually 
composed of citizens without substantial law enforcement experience or any 
other particular qualifications. Generally, their power is restricted to reviewing 
an already completed internal police investigation, and commenting on it to the 
Chief of Police.  Citizen review boards have not been effective at causing 
reform, and often are co-opted by the police department whose investigations 
they are supposed to review.  They wind up agreeing with the police 
department in almost all instances. 
 
 59. See LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, INTERNAL AFFAIRS GROUP, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/organization/ocp/cos/iag/int_affairs_group_main.htm; LOS ANGELES 
POLICE DEP’T, BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, http://www.lapdonline.org/organization/ 
bpc/board_main.htm; LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/organization/bpc/inspector_general/ board_inspector_geneal_1.htm. 
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Newer civilian review board models provide the board with investigatory 
as well as review authority.  Some of these models contemplate that the board 
will conduct parallel investigations to supplement the internal affairs 
investigations.  In some instances, the review board will have subpoena power 
and can force a police officer to testify.  In some jurisdictions, even more 
powerful civilian review boards have sole investigatory power.  It is very rare, 
however, for a civilian review board to have the final say as to the disposition 
of an investigation or discipline to be imposed on an officer.  These ultimate 
decisions generally continue to be the province of the Chief of Police.  
Nonetheless, all civilian review boards with independent investigatory 
authority seem to have the power to make recommendations to the Chief on 
disposition and discipline. 
V.  COMPULSORY MONITORING AND REFORM 
Where a law enforcement agency refuses voluntarily to give access to 
monitors, resists a civilian review board or other outside investigatory body, 
and persists in using excessive force, there are federal statutory remedies that 
can open up a recalcitrant department and achieve the necessary reform.  These 
federal remedies are of recent vintage.  In the wake of the Rodney King 
incident in Los Angeles,60 the Congress of the United States passed legislation 
enabling the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice to commence 
investigations of state and local police alleged to be engaging in an 
unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful pattern or practice of excessive force.61  
If the federal investigation shows that allegations of excessive force are true, a 
federal court is empowered by these laws to enter an injunction compelling 
police reform.62  While in the last five years, the Justice Department has been 
active in forcing police departments to be more open and to undertake 
significant reform, in most instances the local jurisdiction enters into a 
settlement agreement before the federal court issues the injunction.63 
The intent of these federal investigations and decrees is to make closed and 
mysterious internal police processes open and transparent so that police 
officials can be held publicly responsible and accountable for the 
thoroughness, correctness, reasonableness, and fairness of their decisions.  The 
federal remedies have been employed in several jurisdictions to date: 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Steubenville, Ohio; the State of New Jersey; 
Montgomery County, Maryland; Highland Park, Illinois; Washington, DC; Los 
 
 60. Morrison, supra note 1. 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2002). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See infra note 64-67 and accompanying text. 
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Angeles; and, most recently, Cincinnati, Ohio.64  Federal investigations are 
pending in a number of other major US cities, including Detroit, Michigan and 
New Orleans, Louisiana.65 
The consent decree recognizing the agreement reached between the federal 
government and the City of Los Angeles concerning reform of the LAPD is a 
representative example.66  The document details the degree to which the 
federal government is requiring the LAPD to undergo reform and curtail 
excessive force. The federal order has numerous requirements.  The LAPD 
must collect detailed information on the use of force, and make it available to 
the public.  The consent decree requires the LAPD to build a computerized 
relational database of information on use of force, shootings, administrative 
and criminal investigations, racial profiling, and a number of other subjects 
bearing upon risk of police misconduct.  It also requires the existence of the 
Police Commission, the Inspector General, and a monitor appointed to review 
and report on the LAPD’s implementation of the federal order’s requirements, 
including reports to the court if the monitor believes that the LAPD is not 
complying with the decree in good faith.67 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to organize the differing approaches to civilian 
oversight of police agencies in the United States so that they may be viewed as 
a spectrum or continuum.  If law enforcement agencies are willing to undertake 
reform voluntarily, to open their records to public scrutiny, allowing for the 
transparency of internal processes, including internal investigations; then 
initiation of independent, civilian monitoring, the least intrusive means of 
oversight, may be adequate to assure the integrity of a self-regulating police 
agency.  The introduction of independent civilians with real power to oversee 
and structure the course of internal affairs investigations, rather than simply to 
review them after-the-fact, is a further step that may be necessary where 
monitoring does not succeed in curbing police misconduct.  In some instances, 
where the law enforcement agency in question is resistant to greater 
 
 64. SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SETTLEMENTS AND COURT DECISIONS: CONDUCT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.htm#Settlements. 
 65. SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/faq.htm#howmanyPorP. 
Other cities with pending investigations as of January 2003 are: Charleston, WV; Cleveland, OH; 
Eastpointe, MI; Miami, FL; New York City, NY (two investigations); Portland, ME; Prince 
George’s County, MD; Providence, RI; Riverside, CA; Schenectady, NY; and Tulsa, OK. 
 66. Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 (C.D. Cal. approved June 
15, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm. 
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accountability, and cannot, or will not, reduce the use of excessive force, then 
more radical steps may be in order, including complete displacement of 
investigatory authority.  The most extreme intervention may occur if it can be 
demonstrated that, over time, an agency has tolerated a pattern or practice of 
the use of excessive force.  In that case, federal intervention, and consequent 
compulsory reform, including independent monitoring may be required. 
This article is not meant to suggest that each alternative should be 
exhausted before the next is attempted.  Rather, it is meant to suggest that for 
any particular situation, all the alternatives should be considered, and only the 
most fitting alternative selected.  In some sense, the prescription advocated 
here mirrors the best practice in the use of force by the police: force employed 
by the police should be narrowly and precisely calculated to overcome the 
resistance of the suspect.  In some instances, that amount of force may be 
minimal, just enough to handcuff the suspect.  In other cases, e.g., where the 
suspect wields a gun, the force used may need to be more severe.  Just as an 
officer confronted with a resistant suspect needs to carefully select a level of 
force commensurate with the situation presented, the response to a law 
enforcement agency’s resistance to accountability and responsibility for 
managing the risk of misconduct needs to be carefully measured, and 
overcome by the least intrusive option that works. 
The various experiments in civilian oversight of police agencies that are 
described in this article are accomplishing much public good, and should not 
be feared as an inappropriate intrusion in the life of a law enforcement agency.  
Police departments, particularly ones tainted by scandal or corruption, cannot, 
and really should not, attempt to monopolize the reform process by insisting 
that the only path to the restoration of credibility is the trail they blaze 
themselves.  A better approach is to ask what independent civilian oversight 
and review mechanisms are necessary to insure both that internal police 
accountability systems are truly functioning properly, and that public opinion 
is so informed.  Civilian oversight not only corrects deficient systems, but also 
bolsters public confidence in the police, and thereby makes policing better and 
more effective. 
 
